Abstract. We consider the problem of secure integer division: given two Paillier encryptions of -bit values n and d, determine an encryption of n d without leaking any information about n or d. We propose two new protocols solving this problem. The first requires O( ) arithmetic operation on encrypted values (secure addition and multiplication) in O(1) rounds. This is the most efficient constant-rounds solution to date. The second protocol requires only O (log 2 )(κ + loglog ) arithmetic operations in O(log 2 ) rounds, where κ is a correctness parameter. Theoretically, this is the most efficient solution to date as all previous solutions have required Ω( ) operations. Indeed, the fact that an o( ) solution is possible at all is highly surprising.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows two or more mutually mistrusting parties to evaluate a function on private data without revealing additional information. Many potential appliations are motivated by business needs, e.g. running modulo reduction (and hence also integer division). The construction was not presented in any detail and no explicit complexity measure was presented, though naturally it at least equalled that of BD, O( log ). We remark that BD has later been improved in [Tof09, RT10] to O( ) work.
The simpler problem where d is known to all parties (a single party) has been studied by Guajardo et al. [GMS10] and Ning and Xu [NX10] (Veugen [Veu10] ).
Finally, we remark that it is possible to "switch technique" mid-protocol and use homomorphic encryption for arithmetic and (small) Yao circuits for primitives such as integer division as done by Henecka et al. [HKS + 10] . However, achieving active security in this setting typically requires the use of cutand-choose techniques. And, while it is possible to use generic NIZK proofs to demonstrate correct protocol execution to the clients, this will be much more expensive than making the non-generic zero-knowledge proofs of our solution non-interactive, e.g., using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86] .
Contribution. We present two two-party protocols for the problem of secure integer division: given Paillier encryptions of -bit values n and d, compute an encryption of n/d without leaking any information. Both are based on Taylor series. The first protocol requires O( ) encryptions to be exchanged between the parties in a constant number of rounds; this is quite practical for small inputs, e.g., up to 40 bits. The second protocol communicates O (log 2 )(κ + loglog ) encryptions in O(log 2 ) rounds. Moreover, we are able to avoid bit-decomposition; indeed, as the latter complexity is sub-linear in the bit-length, it precludes the use of bit-decompositon entirely. That a sub-linear solution is possible at all is quite surprising, but is of theoretical rather than practical interest. Moreover, in the appendix, we present a protocol for computing the exact bit-length of an encrypted value, which is constructed without replying on bit-decomposition and which may be of independent interest.
We remark that though our protocols are presented in the two-party Pailierbased setting, they are easily converted to both the multiparty setting as well as to other forms of secure arithmetic, e.g. unconditionally secure multiparty computation based on Shamir's secret sharing scheme and the protocols of BenOr et al. [Sha79, BGW88] . Note that due to the underlying primitives, security of the sub-linear solution requires the presence of two mutually incorruptible parties, at least with current state-of-the-art knowledge.
The structure of this paper. Section 2 briefly introduces Paillier's encryption scheme, as well as the basic protocols for secure computation. Then Section 3 presents the main idea, i.e. the Taylor series which defines the desired computation, and the overall protocol is presented in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 then present the two solutions. Concluding, we elaborate on variations in Section 7.
and solving a discrete logarithm base g (which can be done efficiently in this setting). Suppressing the randomness used, we write [m] to denote an encryption of m ∈ Z M below.
Secure computation. Secure multi-party computation can be based on Paillier encryption with a shared threshold key using the protocols of Cramer et al. [CDN01] . The threshold sharing can be constructed using the ideas of Damgård and Jurik [DJ01] . Though not explicitly stated, apart from guaranteed termination, the protocols of [CDN01] are still valid even if all but a single party are corrupt. In particular this allows the two-party setting. We assume the following setting:
-Alice and Bob know a public Paillier key and share the decryption key. The parties send these to each other. As the final step, both parties compute
Assuming through-out the entire paper that decryption to a party is a constant round and communication procedure, the complexity of π mult is also constant in both parameters. Finally, note that zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs may be used to ensure correct behavior, e.g. Prefix-or of a sequence of bits. Given encrypted bits [ In this section we take a high-level view and present the ideas behind the desired computation. The following sections then explain how to do this securely in the stated complexity. Assume in the following that n and d are -bit integers, and let k be a suitable large, public integer. Our solutions then consist of two steps:
Step I is explained over the reals in Section 3.1. This is then converted to integer computation in Section 3.2 and finally realised using Z M arithmetic in Section 3.3. Note that the integer division in step II is simpler as 2 k is public.
The Taylor Series
Similarly to [KLM05] or the constant depth division circuit of Hesse et al. [HAB02] , we start with a geometric series to compute a "k-shifted" approximation of 1/d:
where
i . This is easily verified for any real 0 < α < 1. Further, approximating 1/α by keeping only the first ω + 1 terms of the summation introduces an additive error of ω . If 0 < 1 − α ≤ 1/2 then this error is at most
By picking ω sufficiently large this ensures an appropriately small error below.
Converting the Taylor Series to an Integer Computation
Multiplying 1/α by a power of two "shifts" the value; this ensures that each of the ω + 1 terms of the finite sum of Eq. (1) are integer. The non-integer part of the shifted value is entirely contained in ω , which will be discarded.
Define n similarly. For accuracy it is sufficient to use any ω ≥ max { n − d , 0}. However, letting ω depend on n or d leaks information as ω must be public. Instead we let ω = , which clearly satisfies the accuracy condition. For α = d/2 d and k = 2 + the following expression gives us 1/d shifted up by k bits:
We define the desired approximation of 2
Note that not only is this an integer since k ≥ d (ω + 1) and 2 d > d, it may also be computed as the product of 2 k− d (ω+1) and the evaluation of the integer polynomial with coefficients 2
we have a bound on the additive error by Eq. (2):
This ensures that the result computed in step II is off by at most 1: we have
and see that the second summand is bound by
is the desired result except that the sum of the error, n · 2 k− d · ω , and the discarded bits of the approximation, n ·ã mod 2 k , may be greater than 2 k ; i.e. the result may have an additive error of −1 due to a lost carry-bit.
To recap: Given integers 2
for 0 ≤ i ≤ , performing step I yields an approximationã of 2 k /d using Eq. (3). Down-shifting this almost gives the desired result, namelyq ∈ {q, q − 1}, where q = n/d .
Performing the Integer Computation Using Z M Arithmetic
The underlying primitives provide secure Z M arithmetic, with M = pq being the Paillier key whose secret key is held jointly by the parties. We assume 4 that
where κ s is a statistical security parameter, e.g. κ s = 100. This implies that no "overflow" modulo M occurs in Eq. (3), hence it can be seen as occurring in Z M . However, for efficiency reasons we rephrase the expression as
where addition and multiplication occur in Z M . This should no longer be seen as an integer computation, however, the key observation is that it is irrelevant how the encryption [ã] is obtained; what matters is that the plaintext is correct. Essentially this altered calculation can be viewed as using the encoding of rational values suggested in [FSW02] . Note that this simplifies the desired calculation: we now only need the values 2 
The Overall Division Protocol
Having presented the desired Z M -expression for computing the approximatioñ a ≈ 2 k /d in Section 3.3 above, the goal now is to give a high-level view of the actual protocol. We first formalise the required sub-tasks, and then present the overall protocol based on assumed protocols for these. Instantiating these protocols with either the constant-rounds (Section 5) or the sub-linear (Section 6) versions of the sub-protocols we obtain our two division protocols.
Sub-tasks and Sub-protocols
In addition to the basic primitives of Section 2 we require the following subprotocols:
of an approximation of q/2 k s.t.q = q/2 k + for ∈ {0, 1}.
The High-level View
The full division protocol is seen in Figure 1 and proceeds by the following steps: where the elimination of errors are performed by two secure comparions. 
Correctness. Correctness follows almost entirely from the previous section. For the plaintext of [q], the most significant bits are off by at most 1:
The execution of π trunc may introduce an additional additive error, i.e. we havẽ
Using r = n − d ·q ∈ [−d; 2d[ we can securely determine which case we are in. Namely,q + 1 = n/d when d ≤ r andq − 1 = n/d when 0 > r. In order to deal only with positive integers we scale these tests to respectively 2d ≤ r + d and d > r + d. Letting + and − denote the Boolean outcome of these tests, it follows that q =q + + − − = n/d .
Privacy. The protocol reveals no information about the inputs (other than the desired encryption of the result). This follows from the fact that no value is ever decrypted and that we only invoke secure sub-protocols which do not leak information. We note that π inv and π poly require the input to be invertiblethis is indeed the case as M is the product of two odd primes,
Further, the input [n ·ã] for the truncation is + k-bit long as n < 2 andã ≤ 2 k /d ≤ 2 k , and hence the input is of the correct size. A formal security proof using the real/ideal paradigm requires the construction of a simulator for each party. These are straightforward to construct from the simulators of the sub-protocols; as our protocol consists of the sequential evaluation of sub-protocols, the overall simulator simply consists of the sequential execution of the simulators of these.
Complexity. The complexity depends on the details of the sub-protocols π BL , π poly , π trunc , and π >? . Formally we have Active Security. The protocol in Figure 1 is only passively secure. However, obtaining active security is straightforward by executing appropriate ZK proofs. This increases the communication complexity by a constant factor.
The Constant-rounds Protocol
In this section we plug in protocols for the three sub-tasks. All protocols use a constant number of rounds and linear communication. Combined with the previous section this provides a constant-rounds protocol for division. 
The constant-rounds
π BL protocol In Appendix A we give a π c BL protocol that, somewhat surprising, does not rely on bit-decomposition. Here, for clarity the π c BL protocol presented in Figure 2 is composed of two protocols introduced in Section 2: π c BD and π
The constant-rounds π poly protocol
As shown in the protocol in Figure 3 , we simply evaluate polynomial
pre-Π . This gives encryptions of p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p ω -and knowing these all there is left to do is to sum these together with p 0 = 1 to form A(p).
Correctness, Privacy, Complexity, and Active Security. Noting that the second step of π 
To perform the truncation, party B first picks a random integer of a bit-length sufficient for using it as a mask forq. He also stores the + κ most significent bits of r as r and computes an encryption of it. Upon receiving [z], the masked value ofq, A and B now decrypt [z] for A to see. After learning this value z, A can locally perform the truncation to form z . She sends an encryption of this value to B and both can finally compute the output locally by
Correctness. When computing z it may happen that r causes a carry bit c from the k least significant bits to spill over into the + κ most significant bits. In this case the truncation of z will maintain this carry bit, causing the result of z − r to be q/2 k + 1 instead of q/2 k . For efficiency we allow this error.
Privacy. The only point where information could potentially be leaked is through A seeing z. However, since r is chosen uniformly at random and κ bit longer than q, z leaks information aboutq with probability negligible in κ.
Complexity. We see that the complexity of π Active Security. To obtain active security B must also send r ⊥ = r mod 2 k to A, who in turn must also send z ⊥ = z mod 2 k . B can now append a zeroknowledge proof that z = (r · 2 k + r ⊥ ) +q as well as proofs that both r and r ⊥ are within the correct bounds. Similary, A also appends a proof of z = z ·2 k +z ⊥ and that z and z ⊥ are within bounds.
Combined Protocol and Analysis
By plugging the protocols introduced in this section into the π div protocol of Section 4 we obtain our constant-rounds division protocol π c div . Correctness, privacy, and active security follow from the discussions above. Using the complexity expressions in Eq. 6 from Section 4 and the fact that ω = we get:
The Sub-linear Protocol
In this section we give the protocols needed for giving the division protocol of Section 3 a sub-linear communication complexity. We can reuse the truncation protocol π c trunc from Section 5 and hence only present two new π BL and π poly protocols.
The sub-linear π BL protocol
To compute 2 d from [d] in sub-linear communication complexity we take inspiration from [Tof11] and perform, in a sense, a binary search. Assuming we have a protocol π s ≤? for performing comparison of two encrypted numbers, we give the protocol in Figure 5 . For simplicity we assume that = 2 γ for some integer γ.
Intuitively, our construction recursively computes a pointer p into the binary representation of d. Initially p points to the first bit position (p 0 = 2 0 ). In the first round we then ask in which half of the binary representation of d the most significant 1 occurs and store the result in bit c 1 . Next we update p to point to position /2 1 if c = 1 (i.e. p 1 = p 0 · 2 Correctness and Privacy. Correctness follows from the above description of the protocol, and privacy follows immediately from the sub-protocols as we only compute on encrypted values. + R π mult ) = O(log 2 ) and com-
Active Security. Since the sub-protocol is actively secure, we only have to append zero-knowledge proofs of correctness to every multiplication in order to make the protocol resistant against active attackers. This increases the number of messages communicated but only by a constant factor.
The sub-linear π poly protocol
Evaluating the A(x) = ω i=0 x i polynomial at a point p can be done by a method similar to "square and multiply". We give the protocol in Figure 6 where for simplicity we have assumed that ω = 2 γ for some integer γ. The intuition behind the notation is that σ j = 2 j i=1 x i and x j = x 2 j -it is not hard to see that this is indeed the case. Specifically this gives us that σ γ = 2 γ i=1 x i and hence
Correctness, Privacy, and Complexity. The first two follow respectively from the description above and from that fact that only arithmetical operations on encryptions are performed. For complexity we have that the protocol requires γ = log 2 ω iterations with two multiplications in each. Hence the round complexity is R π s poly = γ · (2 · R π mult ) = O(log ω), and likewise for the communication complexity Active Security. By appending zero-knowledge proofs of correctness to every multiplication we make the protocol resistant against active attackers. This increases the number of messages communicated but only by a constant factor.
The sub-linear π trunc protocol
The truncation protocol π c trunc of Section 5 is efficient enought to be reused for the sub-linear protocol π s trunc : only a single operation is performed, namely the decryption of [z] . The remaining operations can be carried out locally.
Combined Protocol and Analysis
Our sub-linear division protocol π s div is obtained from the π div protocol of Section 4. Correctness, privacy, and active security follow from the discussions in the previous sections and in this section. As for complexity, since ω = , we get:
+O ((log )(κ + loglog )) = O (log 2 )(κ + loglog ) .
Variations and Extensions
The multiparty case. Though we have presented our protocols in the two-party setting, the ideas are also applicable to the multiparty case, based e.g. on the protocols of [CDN01] . Arithmetic operations on encrypted values are immediate, hence we must only consider π BL , π trunc , and the sublinear comparison π >? . For the constant-rounds protocol we may use the arithmetic-based comparison of [NO07] while π BL is essentially the bit-decomposition of [RT10] . Thus, these immediately work in the multiparty setting. The π trunc protocol in Figure 4 can be jointly played by the parties. Part A is played publicly and part B is played using the protocols of [CDN01] . First each party
supplies an encryption of a random value r (i) as well as r (i) with plaintext
. This is the right result plus an additive error originating from a carry in the addition of r. Since r is a sum itself, the possible error grows linearly in the number of parties. However, as in the main protocol ( Figure 1 ) this may be corrected using a number of secure comparisons.
With the additional requirement of two named and mutually incorruptible parties, the sub-linear case follows analogously by the protocols of [Tof11] . Since π BL is based on comparison and arithmetic, and π trunc is the same as the constant-rounds case, a sub-linear multiparty protocol is possible too.
Unconditionally secure integer division. Unconditionally secure variations of our protocols are possible, based e.g. on Shamir's secret sharing scheme and the protocols of Ben-Or et al. [Sha79, BGW88] . The construction is straightforward as all sub-protocols are applicable in this setting as well.
Improving the complexity of the sub-linear protocol. Using the other comparison protocol given in [Tof11] we may obtain slightly better bounds on our division protocol, namely O(log ) rounds and O (log ) √ (κ + log ) communications.
A Computing the Bit-length without Bit-decomposition
In this section we present an alternative way of computing an encryption of the exact bit-length of [d] , which is denoted as [ d ] in the text. We name this alternative protocol Bit-Length(); that is to say, we have
The protocol performs this in a constant number of rounds using a linear number of secure multiplications. We stress that most of the variables mentioned in this section are encrypted or bit-wise encrypted, denoted [·] B , but for simplicity we often do not refer to this explicitly.
Initially, we generate a random, -bit, bitwise encrypted value, [r] B . This can be done by having each party supply random bits and computing the XOR:
This will be used as a random mask for [d] ; to mask the final carry each party supplies an additional κ-bit, random value, r (i) which is multiplied by 2 and added to the masked value.
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We then decrypt
and reduce e modulo 2 to getē = (e mod 2 ). Since both d and r are at most -bit long, then it is easy to see that the integer sum of d and r (denoted as e = d + r) has two possible values:ē andē + 2 ; by comparing [r] B andē (which is public), we can decide which case it is and then select the correct (bitwise encrypted) value for the integer sumẽ = d + r. Note that the bit-length ofẽ may reach + 1. The addition process (over the integers)ẽ = d + r can be seen in Figure 7 . For this addition process, we will use c i to denote the carry-bit generated in bit-position i, i.e. c i = 1 means the (i + 1)'th bit-position will get a "1" from the i'th bit-position. 
We use cur (which is a shorthand for "current") to denote the index of the left-most "1" in E. Obviously, we can get the encryption of cur easily from Below we define some necessary notations.
-Denote by a i ↔ j for i > j the sub-string of bit-vector a from i to j, i.e. = aim]. This is done based on the following observation:
-If cur = aim, then c cur−1 = c aim−1 = 0. This follows from the fact that cur = aim implies c aim = 0, and then by the fact that d aim = 1, we can see r aim = c aim−1 = 0. -Otherwise (i.e. cur > aim), we have c cur−1 = 1. In this case, c aim = 1, and therefore all the bits in r cur−1 ↔ aim+1 are "1". That is to say, "cur = aim" ⇔ "c cur−1 = 0". Hence, we need only compute [c cur−1 ], which can be done by comparing the bit-decomposed r cur−1 ↔ 0 and ẽ cur−1 ↔ 0 . Note the important fact that both r cur−1 ↔ 0 andẽ cur−1 ↔ 0 (padded with "0"s on the left such that they are bits long) can be obtained easily using a componentwise logical AND (multiplication) with the vector [E] B .
After determining [cur ?
= aim], we can compute d in both the two cases (cur = aim and cur > aim) and then select the correct one (using [cur ?
= aim]). II. Below we will discuss the two cases in detail.
(a) cur = aim In this case, we have c aim = 0. This case is very simple. We need only to sum up all the bits of [E] B to get d . (b) cur > aim
In this case, we have c aim = 1. This case is somewhat involved. We need to compute the gap between cur and aim (i.e. the number of the bits between bit-positions cur and aim). We proceed as follows i. First we denote by t an ( + 1)-bit long, bit-decomposed integer satisfying "t i = 1" ⇔ "r i = 1 andẽ i = 0" for i ∈ 0, 1, · · · , l. This can be obatined by setting t i = r i − r i ·ẽ i . It is easy to see that all the bits in t cur−1 ↔ aim+1 are "1" and that the bits of t ↔ cur are "0". ii. For this integer t, we set all the bits in t ↔ cur to "1" by adding the all-1 vector and entrywise subtracting [
The resulting vector will be denoted t . iii. We compute T = Prefix-∧ (t ) (using a protocol analogous to π c pre-∨ , [DFK + 06] ). We have the following two facts: A. All the bits in T ↔ aim+1 are "1".
This is obvious because all the bits in t ↔ aim+1 are "1". B. All the bits in T aim−1 ↔ 0 are "0". This can be proven based on two cases: -If t aim = 0, then this is obvious.
-If t aim = 1, then t aim = 1 and this means r aim = 1 and e aim = 0. Recall that d aim = 1, so we can see that c aim−1 = 0. Then we can say that "r aim−1 = 1" and "ẽ aim−1 = 0" can not hold at the same time (because if this happens, we have c aim−1 = 1). So, we have t aim−1 = 0 and the claim is proved. iv. Then we need to decide the value of the bit T aim . We use a comparison to do this. We denote the index of the left-most "0" of [T ] B (or we can say "the first '0' of [T ] B ") as f ir0. Then obviously, f ir0 can be aim (when T aim = 0) or aim − 1 (when T aim = 1). It is easy to see that, no matter what f ir0 is, r f ir0 ↔ 0 andẽ f ir0 ↔ 0 can be obtained with the help of [T ] B . Below we discuss what will happen when T aim is 0 or 1.
-When T aim = 0 In this case, we have f ir0 = aim. Recall that we are discussing
